WHAT IS ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY?

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philosophical texts *sub specie aeternitatis* in fact amounts to no more than this: analytic philosophers speak in their own voice, instead of constantly disavowing their own beliefs. Mindful of the difference between belief and truth they are also aware of the possibility that their beliefs will turn out to be false. And if they are historically conscious, and a rising number of them are, they will also be aware that reading a text from the past puts both the author and the interpreter to precisely this test.

In conclusion, neither historiophobia nor anachronism is a distinguishing feature of analytic philosophy. And in so far as many (though by no means all) analytic philosophers resist the excesses of historicism (intrinsic and instrumental historicism, historical relativism, undiscriminating charity), they are on the side of the angels.

CHAPTER 5

Doctrines and topics

Many readers will feel that up to this stage I have been beating about the bush. In so far as analytic philosophy constitutes a genuine philosophical movement, tradition or current, shouldn't its proponents be united by certain philosophical interests or views? It is high time to spare a thought for the rather obvious suggestion that analytic philosophy is characterized by certain topics and/or doctrines. We might call such topical or doctrinal conceptions of analytic philosophy 'material', to distinguish them from formal (methodological and stylistic) conceptions to be considered in the next chapter.

Philosophers have a notorious penchant for disagreement, and closer inspection tends to reveal diversity even within paradigmatic schools or movements. In the case of analytic philosophy, this general phenomenon is particularly pronounced. Most commentators would concur with Soames' denial that analytic philosophy is a 'highly cohesive school or approach to philosophy, with a set of tightly knit doctrines that define it' (2003: xii). Even with respect to specific currents, contemporary scholars go out of their way to stress that they involved greater variety than commonly assumed. Both Hacker (1996: 228–9) and Warnock (1998) point out that the label 'Oxford ordinary language philosophy' was only used by opponents, and that post-war Oxford philosophy did not constitute a uniform school. Similarly, historians of logical positivism maintain that it was not the monolithic philosophical faction of popular repute (Haller 1993; Uebel 1991). As we had occasion to observe (ch. 1.2), many analytic philosophers regard philosophical schools and -isms as intellectually unwholesome, since they smack of the kind of dogmatism that they would rather associate with their opponents.

As regards specific trends within analytic philosophy, however, protestations of diversity and heterodoxy must be taken with more than a pinch of salt. After all, the logical positivists self-consciously devised and applied labels to their own position: 'scientific philosophy', 'scientific world-view',

'logical positivism', 'logical empiricism', etc. They had their own societies (*Verein Ernst Mach* in Vienna, *Gesellschaft für Wissenschaftliche Philosophie* in Berlin), journals (*Erkenntnis*), series of publications (*Schriften zur Wissenschaftlichen Weltauffassung*) and conferences (especially on the Unity of Science). The Vienna Circle even had its own 'Manifesto' (Carnap, Neurath and Hahn 1929). The logical positivists also had their internal disputes and factions – notably what are now known as the left and the right wing of the Vienna Circle – as befits any proper philosophical school. Furthermore, their early writings abound with purple passages about common aims, convictions, and enemies, and about the need for collaboration and 'collective work' of the kind familiar from the natural sciences (1929: 6–7). What is more, during their heyday the logical positivists were indeed united in their rejection of metaphysics and of synthetic *a priori* knowledge, and in their commitment to empiricism and the unity of science.

With the possible exception of Austin, conceptual analysts did not aspire to scientific collaboration or to forming a cohesive group under a single philosophical banner. Nevertheless, they shared an *ésprit de corps* especially in their dealings with outsiders like the dreaded logical positivists and the despised continentals (see ch. 3.1). Furthermore, they shared some general views about the nature of philosophy. They were united in taking a linguistic turn, in distinguishing between philosophy and science, and in preferring analysis and paraphrase of the vernacular to the construction of artificial languages.

At present, there are countless schools and -isms within analytic philosophy, even if one leaves aside labels like 'California semantics' and 'right-wing Wittgensteinians' which are used pejoratively by opponents. Some -isms derive from the great pioneers and heroes. To name but a few, there are Wittgensteinians, New Wittgensteinians, Quineans, Sellarsians and Davidsonians. In addition, there are '-isms' of a more or less general kind: naturalism, physicalism, descriptivism and (semantic) anti-realism. There is also a crop of *neo*-isms (neo-Fregeans, neo-Russellians) and *quasi*-isms ('quasi-realism'), and some opponents of Hare's and Mackie's meta-ethical views proudly called themselves 'anti-noncognitivists'. In short, analytic philosophy has thrown up taxonomic labels to rival even the most baroque continental efforts. At least one group, which calls itself 'The Canberra Planners' and is based at the Australian National University, even publishes a *Credo* on the internet: < web.syr.edu/~dpnolan/philosophy/Credo (28.10.2004) > . The *Credo* professes, among other things: 'We believe in the substantial correctness of the doctrines of David Lewis about most things (except the nature of possible worlds).' It ends with 'Amen', as befits such outpourings of piety. Though tongue in cheek, this *Credo* nevertheless bears witness to the fact that some analytic philosophers feel the intellectual or emotional urge to subscribe publicly not just to a common set of *doxa* but also to a figurehead.

In so far as the image or self-image of analytic philosophy is determined by one or other of its various movements or schools, the idea of defining it by reference to topics or doctrines is strikingly plausible. The obvious problem is that analytic philosophy features *different* and often *warring* authors, schools, movements and doctrines. As a result, material definitions of analytic philosophy are too narrow. Nevertheless, it is worth teasing out their strengths and weaknesses, not least because some of them have been propagated by eminent practitioners and scholars.

Analytic philosophers are no strangers to controversy. Atomists line up against holists, theists against atheists and agnostics, materialists and realists against phenomenalists and idealists, utilitarians against deontologists and virtue theorists, conflicting theories of meaning and of the mind are cheaper by the dozen, and so on, and so forth. To be even remotely plausible, therefore, the purportedly defining doctrines must be suitably general and have implications for the method and self-image of philosophy. I shall discuss definitions of analytic philosophy by reference to four doctrines: the rejection of metaphysics (section 1), the linguistic turn (section 2), the division of labour between philosophy and science (section 3), and naturalism (section 4). The final section turns to the question of whether analytic philosophers are united by the exclusion of certain topics or an obsession with other topics.

1 THE CRUSADE AGAINST METAPHYSICS

The earliest doctrinal conception associates analytic philosophy with the repudiation of metaphysics. This view of analytic philosophy was quite common among early opponents, though they often referred to it under other labels, notably logical positivism, analysis and linguistic philosophy (Blanshard 1962; Lewis 1963). It persists to this day, especially on the continent (e.g. Müller and Halder 1979: 18; Hügli and Lübcke 1991: 35). As mentioned in chapter 3.5, the current division between analytic and continental philosophy was preceded by a division between analytic and *traditional* philosophy. Traditional philosophy was predominantly committed to the idea that metaphysics can provide us with distinctively philosophical insights into the nature of reality. To the traditionalist

philosophers that keep the flag of traditional philosophy flying today, analytic philosophy still tends to be epitomized by the anti-metaphysical crusade of the logical positivists. Even continental philosophers without a brief for traditional metaphysics (Babich 2003) have scolded analytic philosophy for adopting a deflationary attitude that seeks to dissolve philosophical problems rather than to revel in their profundity.

The members of the Vienna Circle characterized their common outlook as a *Scientific World View*, as in the title of their manifesto (Carnap, Hahn and Neurath 1929). This scientific world-view conceives of science as the epitome of human rationality which would sweep away theology and metaphysics as the vestiges of the Dark Ages. The logical positivists regarded metaphysics as theology in disguise, and hence as an expression of superstition or misguided artistic impulse. In truly Teutonic fashion, they fancied themselves in the role of 'storm-troopers of the anti-metaphysical and resolutely scientific school of research' (Frank 1935: 4). In their crusade against metaphysics, our Viennese storm troopers wielded three devastating weapons: the new logic of Frege and Russell, the *Tractatus* claim that all necessity is tautological, and the verificationist criterion of meaningfulness, which they derived from their contacts with Wittgenstein. In this vein, Carnap and Ayer complained that the Hegelian notion of the Absolute is a mere pseudo-concept. A sentence like 'Only the Absolute contains the truth as such' has no more literal or cognitive meaning than the sound-sequence 'Ab sur ah', since no experience could establish its truth or falsity. Similarly, Heidegger's pronouncements 'We know the Nothing' or 'The Nothing noths' are on a par with 'Caesar is and'. They violate the rules of logical syntax by treating the term 'nothing' – a logical quantifier which indicates the absence of things of a certain kind – as if it were the name of a particularly mysterious thing (Carnap 1932; Ayer 1936: 59).

But how could some of the most intelligent members of the human race – a self-image readily accepted by analytic and continental philosophers alike – mistake sheer gibberish for profound insights into the essence of reality? The positivists' answer to this question is equally striking, and it owes more than a passing debt to Nietzsche's *Lebensphilosophie* and his critique of metaphysics. Metaphysical statements have no cognitive meaning, since they are neither verifiable nor falsifiable. But they constitute a kind of 'conceptual poetry'. They express or arouse certain emotions, or a certain attitude towards life (*Lebensgefühl*). Unfortunately, they do so in a misleading and unsatisfactory way, because they clad these emotions or attitudes in the form of a statement about the essence of the world (Carnap 1963: 4; 1932: 78–80; Ayer 1936: 59–61; Schlick 1926: 158). Metaphysicians

are 'misplaced poets', or 'musicians without musical talent'. Monistic metaphysicians are failed Mozarts, because they express a harmonious attitude to life, dualists are failed Beethovens, because they express a heroic attitude in an equally misguided fashion. What kind of metaphysics would a failed Vaughan Williams produce? The mind boggles!

In spite of his designated role as a supplier of arms, Wittgenstein disapproved of the war on metaphysics waged in his name. He criticized the logical positivists on the (justified) grounds that 'there was nothing new about abolishing metaphysics' (Nedo and Ranchetti 1983: 243). In conversations with members of the Vienna Circle Wittgenstein not only defended Schopenhauer, he even feigned to understand what Heidegger means by *Sein* and *Angst* (1979: 68; Carnap 1963: 26–7). Wittgenstein was alienated by the scientistic trajectory of the positivist overcoming of metaphysics. Nevertheless, he was officially hostile to all metaphysical statements both in the early and in the later work. To be sure, the *Tractatus* had maintained that there are metaphysical truths about the essential structure which language and the world must share. At the same time he maintained that these truths cannot be 'said' – meaningfully expressed in philosophical propositions – but are 'shown' by empirical propositions properly analysed. But this idea of an ineffable metaphysics stands in stark contrast to the metaphysical tradition. Furthermore, in his later work Wittgenstein abandoned the idiosyncratic idea of an ineffable metaphysics, *without* reinstating the more venerable project of effable metaphysics (Glock 1996: 330–6; Hacker 2001: chs. 4–5). Metaphysical theories, he continued to insist, are 'houses of cards' erected on linguistic confusions. They need to be torn down by bringing 'words back from their metaphysical to their everyday use', i.e. by reminding us of the way in which words are used outside of metaphysical discourse (1953: §§116–19).

To a lesser degree, the anti-metaphysical definition also covers the abstention from metaphysical claims practised by most Oxford philosophers. But that abstention was overcome, at least in name, by Strawson's descriptive metaphysics. Furthermore, the definition leaves out Moore and Russell, who explicitly espoused lavish metaphysical doctrines throughout their careers. While Russell welcomed the positivists' aspiration to make philosophy scientific through the use of logical analysis, he resisted their attacks on metaphysics (1940: 21, chs. 22 and 25; 1950).

At the same time, both Moore and Russell contributed to the ideas that inform the attack on metaphysics. Many philosophers of the past have disparaged the theories of their predecessors as false, unfounded or pointless. But the early Wittgenstein accused metaphysical theories of suffering

from a more basic defect, namely that of being nonsensical. It is not just that they provide wrong answers, but that the questions they address are misguided questions to begin with (what the logical positivists called 'pseudo-questions'). This *critique of (non-)sense* was inspired by Moore's tactic of questioning the question: Moore tried to *dissolve* rather than answer questions which lead to misguided philosophical alternatives. It was also inspired by Russell's theory of types, which introduced a systematic dichotomy between propositions which are true or false and statements which are meaningless, although they may be impeccable as regards vocabulary and syntax (e.g. 1919: 137).

The idea that at least *some* metaphysical theories fail to make sense crops up earlier still. In the course of criticizing Fichte, Schelling and Hegel, Bolzano confesses that he doubts whether he has fathomed the correct meaning of these authors (1837: I §7), thereby anticipating scores of similarly ironical confessions of analytic philosophers. Even Frege's attitude to metaphysics is ambivalent. On the one hand, his philosophy of logic and mathematics commits him to weighty metaphysical claims about abstract objects. On the other hand, while he did not condemn metaphysics, he insisted that it should play second fiddle to logic. Logic can no more be based on a metaphysical foundation than on a psychological one, since it is presupposed in all other cognitive endeavours: 'I regard it as a failsafe sign of error if logic stands in need of metaphysics and psychology, disciplines which themselves require logical principles. After all, where is here the real foundation, on which everything rests? Or is it as in the case of Münchhausen, who pulled himself out of the bog by his own tuft?' (1893: XIX).

Even this minimal claim, however, is rejected by some contemporary analytic philosophers. One recurrent theme in recent publications is that metaphysics is not just legitimate but the most fundamental subject both inside and outside of philosophy. Disregarding Frege's reminder that, by its very definition, it is *logic* which investigates the principles of reasoning presupposed in *all* cognitive disciplines, Lowe maintains that metaphysics is 'the most fundamental form of rational inquiry' (1998: vi).

This change of fortune is particularly striking in the case of ontology. The logical positivists had denounced ontology as either trivial or meaningless. But attitudes changed from the fifties onward, in the wake of Quine's naturalistic conception of ontology. Instead of having a good laugh about Heidegger's 'The Nothing noths', analytic philosophers took up ontology themselves, and with a vengeance. The war cry that philosophy should concern itself with things instead of words, with reality instead of concepts, has gained wide currency (e.g. Wolterstorff 1970: xii; Armstrong 1980: 37–9). Even today, most analytic philosophers would repudiate the idea that ontology investigates 'Being' or 'Nothing' as based on reification (but see Jubien 1997: 1; Jacquette 2002). Nevertheless, it is generally assumed that ontology deals with two problems which are more fundamental than those of epistemology, semantics and perhaps even logic (e.g. Laurence and MacDonald 1998: 3–4; cf. Glock 2003: ch. 2).

What kinds of things exist?

What is the nature or essence of these kinds?

While Quine's naturalistic conception of ontology rehabilitated the first question against logical positivism, the second question was reinstated against Quine by the Kripke-led revival of essentialism. As a result of both developments, most contemporary practitioners regard the earlier hostility to ontology and metaphysics as an infantile disorder of analytic philosophy. Putnam writes: 'while at one time (during the period of logical positivism) [analytic philosophy] was an anti-metaphysical movement, it has recently become the most pro-metaphysical movement on the world philosophical scene' (1992: 187). Although I do not know what alternatives he has in mind, I share his diagnosis. Many continental philosophers subscribe to the project of deconstructing metaphysics. And history has taught many traditionalist philosophers to respect metaphysical systems more for their ingenuity than for providing apodictic information about the nature of reality. The current analytic mainstream, by contrast, is confident that one last heave will get them to the bottom of things (see ch. 9.2). In short: hostility to metaphysics is absent both at the beginning of analytic philosophy and at present. Therefore it does not provide an acceptable characterization of the analytic movement, even though it fits important representatives between the wars.

2 LANGUAGE, CONTEXTUALISM AND ANTI-PSYCHOLOGISM

In the eyes of traditionalist philosophers, analytic philosophy is not just characterized negatively by the rejection of metaphysics, but positively by the idea that philosophy should turn into the logical or conceptual analysis of language. This reorientation towards language is often referred to as the 'linguistic turn' – following Rorty (1967) – or as the method of 'semantic ascent' – following Quine (1960: §56).

When twentieth-century philosophy is compared with its predecessors, an obsession with language does indeed emerge as one of its most striking features. For the most part, this phenomenon is greeted with hostile

incredulity by external observers. Surely, they say, if philosophy is the profound and fundamental discipline which it has purported to be for more than two millennia, it must deal with something more serious than mere words, namely the things they stand for, and ultimately the essence of reality or of the human mind.[1]

This reaction is not confined to laymen and -women, but shared by many philosophers who are far removed from common sense. Indeed, Dummett has claimed that the concern with language is the elusive factor, long sought for in vain by Anglo-European conferences, which separates the phenomenological tradition on the continent founded by Husserl from Anglophone analytical philosophy. Dummett proposed the following 'succinct definition':

> analytic philosophy is post-Fregean philosophy . . . we may characterize analytic philosophy as that which follows Frege in accepting that the philosophy of language is the foundation of the rest of the subject . . .
>
> Only with Frege was the proper object of philosophy finally established: namely, first, that the goal of philosophy is the analysis of the structure of *thought*; secondly, that the study of *thought* is to be sharply distinguished from the study of the psychological process of thinking; and, finally, that the only proper method for analysing thought consists in the analysis of *language*. (1978: 441, 458)

Without the emphasis on Frege, the proposal reoccurs in *Origins of Analytical Philosophy*:

> What distinguishes analytical philosophy, in its diverse manifestations, from other schools is the belief, first, that a philosophical account of thought can be obtained through a philosophical account of language, and, secondly, that a comprehensive account can only be so obtained . . . Analytical philosophy was born when the 'linguistic turn' was taken. (1993: 4–5, see chs. 2, 12–13)

Dummett contrasts analytic philosophy with the philosophy of thought – developed in Husserl's phenomenology – which retains the idea that philosophy should investigate thought, but claims that this investigation is independent of, and antecedent to, an understanding of language.

Dummett's definition has been tremendously influential, if perhaps more by way of provocation than inspiration (e.g. Williamson 2004). Most contemporary commentators reject the idea that a linguistic turn is the defining feature of analytic philosophy. But the idea continues to find favour, not least among those who, whether rightly or wrongly, would reject the label for themselves (see ch. 8.1). In assessing it, we must keep in

[1] Gellner's attack on Oxford philosophy (1959) provides an amusing, if unsophisticated, example.

mind that criticisms of Dummett to the effect that the linguistic turn leads philosophy astray (or even round the bend) are not to the current point. Our question is not whether taking a linguistic turn is necessary and/or sufficient for philosophical success, but whether it is necessary and/or sufficient for being an analytic philosopher.[2] It is imperative, moreover, to distinguish the different claims that make up the linguistic turn and hence analytic philosophy as portrayed by Dummett:

1 The basic task of philosophy is the analysis of the structure of thought.
2 The structure of thought must be distinguished from the structure of thinking.
3 The only proper way of analysing the structure of thought consists in analysing the structure of the linguistic expression of thought.
4 Consequently, the philosophy of language is the foundation of philosophy.
5 Central to the linguistic turn is contextualism, the idea that sentences are semantically prior to their components.

According to Dummett, the linguistic turn was first taken through Frege's famous 'context-principle' (Dummett 1993: 4–5). Similarly Kenny: 'If, therefore, analytic philosophy was born when the "linguistic turn" was taken, its birthday must be dated to the publication of *The Foundations of Arithmetic* in 1884, when Frege decided that the way to investigate the nature of number was to analyse sentences in which numerals occur' (1995: 211). As we shall see, Kenny's qualification concerning the link between analytic philosophy and the linguistic turn is sapient. What about the link between the linguistic turn and the context-principle?

Among Frege's 'fundamental principles' for the conduct of logical inquiry is not just 'always to separate sharply the logical from the psychological, the subjective from the objective', but also 'never to ask for the meaning of a word in isolation, but only in the context of a sentence'. Further on he adopts a strong restrictive context-principle: 'Only in the context of a proposition do words mean something' (1884: Pref. and §62).

In the wake of Frege, contextualist ideas of various types and strengths have been repeated by countless philosophers of language, Wittgenstein, Quine and Davidson pre-eminent among them (Glock 1996: 86–9; 2003a: 141–6). Contextualism and its more radical cousin holism constitute highly

[2] This disposes of those passages by Cohen (1986: 8, 12–34) in which he argues against the philosophical fecundity of the linguistic turn. As regards its claim to define analytic philosophy, Cohen objects that analytic philosophers couldn't disagree if they were merely concerned with language. As the philosophy of language makes depressingly clear, however, there is no reason to suppose that philosophers are more likely to reach consensus on language than on any other topic.

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important strands within analytic philosophy. Nevertheless, it is problematic to tie either the linguistic turn or analytic philosophy to contextualism.

As Quine (1953: 37–42; 1981: 68–9) and Hacker (1996: 281) noted, the idea that 'the way to investigate X is to look at sentences in which "X" occurs' was first propounded in Bentham's theory of fictions (1817: App. IX), over fifty years before Frege's *Foundations*. More importantly, contextualism is neither necessary nor sufficient for taking a linguistic turn. The idea that the truth-apt whole is in some sense *prior* to its components can easily be transposed from a linguistic onto a mentalist or Platonist plane, from sentences and words to, respectively, judgements and concepts or propositions and concepts. Thus Kant famously (or not so famously, judging by analytic debates on contextualism) insisted that the sole function of concepts is to be used in judgements (*Critique of Pure Reason* B 92–3). Furthermore, it is possible to take a linguistic turn while endorsing an atomistic rather than a contextualist conception of meaning and language. This has been done by pre-analytic empiricists (see Quine 1981: 67–8). It is certain, moreover, that combining atomism and a linguistic turn would not disqualify someone from being an analytic philosopher.

Having dismissed the suggestion that contextualism is definitive of the linguistic turn, let us turn to the question of whether the linguistic turn is definitive of analytic philosophy. Dummett deserves credit not just for having reopened the debate about the nature of analytic philosophy, but also for drawing attention to the important role that the contrast between thought and language has played in its career. Taken with a pinch of salt, moreover, his four claims can be portrayed as central themes in early Wittgenstein, the logical positivists, Quine and Davidson. Even if one takes into account the scope of the canvas on which Dummett paints, however, his brush-strokes are inaccurate.

As regards (1), we can readily grant that thought is an important topic in the philosophy of mind. But why should it be *the* topic of philosophy as a whole? Now, according to (2), what (1) is driving at is not the process of thinking – goings-on in the minds of individuals – but thought in the sense of what is thought. This would mean that the fundamental task of philosophy is to analyse propositions. (2) has the merit of drawing attention to the role played by *anti-psychologism* in the formation of analytic philosophy. In spite of the revolutionary progress in the formal or technical aspects of logic, the nineteenth-century debate about the *nature* of logic proceeded on the traditional assumption that logic studies the *laws of thought*, laws of correct thinking and reasoning, as in the title of Boole's major work – *An Investigation of the Laws of Thought* (1854). What unites all psychologistic

accounts of logic is the idea that these laws describe how human beings (by and large) think, their basic mental operations, and that they are determined by the nature of the human mind. By the same token, logic is ultimately a branch of psychology, as Mill insisted (1865: 245–6). Beyond this general consensus, however, psychologism comes in at least three different forms – transcendental, empiricist and naturalistic.

The former two are united in explaining logical laws by reference to *subjective* mental goings-on which are accessible to introspection. According to the empiricist version, the structures and operations of the mind are contingent on human nature, and to be investigated by empirical psychology (Mill, Erdmann). According to the transcendental version, they are immutable and necessary features without which experience would be unintelligible. Naturalistic psychologism agrees with the empiricist version on the empirical nature of logic-*qua*-psychology, but rejects its subjectivism and introspectivism. Thus the German naturalists followed Mill in maintaining that psychology rather than logic or metaphysics is the fundamental science (Czolbe 1855: 8). However, unlike the British empiricists, they conceived of psychology and experience in physiological terms, as concerning movements of the nervous system.

Against psychologism, Frege protested that logical laws do not describe how we actually think, but prescribe how 'one *should* think'. They are strictly necessary and objective laws of 'truth', not contingent laws of 'holdings-to-be-true' (1893: XV–XIX). Whereas psychology is an empirical science dealing with individual minds on the one hand, logic is an *a priori* discipline concerned with objective principles on the other. We must distinguish sharply between *thinking* as a subjective mental act or episode and a *thought* as the objective content of such an episode.

Anti-psychologism unites Frege with Bolzano, Moore, middle Russell, Wittgenstein and Carnap. The latter complains, for instance, that epistemology as hitherto practised is an 'unclear mixture of psychological and logical constituents' (1936b: 36). This does not vindicate (2), however. On the one hand, anti-psychologism is not a uniform feature of analytic philosophy. In fact, both its empiricist and its naturalistic streaks strongly tend towards psychologism. The account of meaning furnished by the later Russell was psychologistic. And while that account may have had little impact (Green 2001: 520–1), the opposite holds of Quine's naturalized epistemology. Yet this subject dissolves both epistemology and semantics into empirical psychology no less than the systems of Fries, Beneke, Mill and Hamilton. In fact, the lecture on which Quine's eponymous 'Epistemology Naturalized' was based originally had the sub-title 'The

Case for Psychologism' (Willard 1989: 287–8). To be sure, Quine avoids the subjectivism of empiricist forms of psychologism, since the psychological basis of both knowledge and meaning is provided by intersubjectively accessible neural stimulations rather than private ideas or sense-data (Glock 2003: 185–8). But this simply displays a physiological approach to psychology itself, reminiscent of the German naturalists. In any event, a majority of contemporary naturalists sympathize with the cognitive turn in philosophy of language, philosophy of mind and the behavioural sciences; and they rely heavily on the notion of a mental representation, conceived as a phenomenon in the mind of individuals. As Smith points out, the 'earlier aversion of analytic philosophers to psychology has been abandoned' in 'much contemporary work on logic and meaning in the field of cognitive science' (1994: 189; also Willard 1989: 286–7).

On the other hand, anti-psychologism is not the preserve of analytic philosophers. Husserl's *Logische Untersuchungen* is a *locus classicus* of anti-psychologism. Husserl insists that logical laws, far from being reducible to psychological regularities, 'belong to a theoretically closed round of abstract truth, that cannot in any way be fitted into previously delimited theoretical disciplines' (1900: 80, see also 76). Admittedly, this anti-psychologism may have been influenced by Frege's criticism of Husserl's youthful *Philosophie der Arithmetik*. Furthermore, *Logische Untersuchungen* can be portrayed as a proto-analytic work by an Austrian philosopher who was later led down the garden path (Mulligan 1990: 228–32). This is cold comfort for Dummett, however, since claiming it for analytic philosophy is out of the question if that label is tied to the linguistic turn specified in (3) and (4).

Furthermore, non-analytic opponents of psychologism were not confined to Husserl. It is popular to accuse Kant, Hegel and their various nineteenth-century successors of confusing logic not just with metaphysics and epistemology, but also with psychology (Kneale and Kneale 1984, 355; Carl 1994: chs. 1–2; cf. Dipert 1998). There is some justice in this picture. Kant's transcendental idealism treats the necessary preconditions of experience as features to which the objects of experience have to conform because they are imposed on them by our cognitive apparatus in the course of processing the incoming data. This transcendental psychology was one of the main sources of nineteenth-century psychologistic logic (another one being associationist and introspectionist psychology), because it suggests that the mind can underpin apparently necessary propositions in logic, mathematics and metaphysics.

At the same time, Kant also inaugurated crucial anti-genetic and anti-psychologistic modes of thought. What makes a belief *a priori* is not how we acquire it, but rather how it can be verified. Furthermore, he distinguished between the question of how we acquire a certain kind of experience or belief (*quaestio facti*) and the question of what the logical and epistemological status of that experience or belief is (*quaestio iuris*). By the same token, he separated transcendental philosophy from 'empirical psychology', notably Locke's 'physiology of the human understanding' (see A 84–5/B 116–17; A ix; 1783: §21a). As regards logic, he insisted on the purity of *formal* logic – a term he coined, incidentally – separating it from psychology, metaphysics and anthropology.[3] Like Frege, he also insisted on the *topic-neutrality* and *normativity* of logical laws (B VIII; see Trendelenburg 1840: 35).

Kant inspired Lotze, Sigwart, Liebmann and the Southwest school of Neo-Kantianism, who in turn anticipated and influenced core tenets of Frege's anti-geneticism and anti-psychologism (Sluga 1997; Glock 1999b; Anderson 2005; cf. Dummett 1973: 676). They are united in the view that logic and epistemology are autonomous, distinct not just from psychology, but also from other natural sciences such as physiology. Thus Lotze (1874: 316–22) and Windelband (1884: I 24) distinguished explicitly between the genesis of our beliefs and their validity. While being (*Sein*) and genesis (*Genese*) are investigated by empirical science, investigating the validity of knowledge claims is the prerogative of philosophy (logic and epistemology). In the same breadth, these thinkers *separated* logic from natural science by insisting on its normative character, just as Frege did. Finally, they drew an increasingly pronounced distinction between the act of judging – what Frege calls a judgement – and the content of the judgement – what Frege calls a judgeable content or thought.

Anti-psychologism even extends to Hegelianism. The absolute idealists in Britain were no less adamant in rejecting any attempt to ground logic in mental operations than Moore and Russell (Hacker 1996: 5–6). What is more, Hegel himself had already complained about Kant's 'psychological idealism' (1816: II 227; see Aschenberg 1982: 61). And this is not simply disingenuous. Their image among analytic philosophers notwithstanding (e.g. Dummett 1973: 683), neither German nor British Idealism reduced reality to episodes in the minds of individuals. Instead, they insisted that reality is intelligible only because it is the manifestation of a divine spirit or rational principle. Though obviously problematic for other reasons, this

[3] In this respect Kant is close to Frege, and contrasts (favourably, in my view) with Bolzano, who saw fit to include under the heading of logic various methodological and pedagogic recipes, thereby making the subject 'dependent on psychology' (1837: I §§7–13).

position is entirely immune to Bolzano's and Frege's criticisms of *subjective* idealism and psychologism.

(1) can no more serve as a defining credo of analytic philosophy than (2). One counter-example is invoked by Williamson (2004: 108), namely philosophers of mind who reckon with non-conceptual representations that may not qualify as thought. But the investigation of non-conceptual mentality is compatible with what Williamson calls the 'representational turn' and what I have called the 'reflective turn' (1997b). It does not contradict the Kantian idea that philosophy is a second-order discipline which reflects on the way we represent reality, whether in language, conceptual thought or non-conceptual perception.

Other analytic philosophers reject that idea in all its manifestations. Throughout his career, Russell insisted that the fundamental task of philosophy is 'to understand the world as well as may be', rather than merely to analyse thought or language. Indeed, this was his heartfelt complaint against the later Wittgenstein and Oxford conceptual analysis. By his own admission, ahead of exposure to the early Wittgenstein, he was not interested in language and meaning, since he regarded them as 'transparent'. Logic is central to philosophy precisely because it is 'concerned with the real world just as truly as zoology, though with its more abstract and general features', because it provides an 'inventory' of 'the different forms that facts may have' (Russell 1959: 161, 108; 1919: 169; 1918: 216). Similarly for Moore, 'The first and most important problem of philosophy is: to give a general description of the *whole* universe' (1953: 1–2). Last but not least, there are numerous recent manifestations of such a view. They include all those who have taken an ontological turn and regard the metaphysical investigation of reality as philosophy's defining vocation, and they range from Quinean naturalists through Kripkean metaphysicians to Searle, who seeks a 'unified theory of reality' (2004).

In one passage, Dummett attributes to analytic philosophy the metaphysical aim of describing 'the most general structural features of reality', but through 'pure reflection, unaided by empirical investigation' and hence 'by extrapolating from the most general structural features of our thought or of our language'. 'It makes no difference whether language is taken to be prior to thought in the order of philosophical explanation, or thought to be prior to language. The former is the order of priority traditional in analytical philosophy indeed, until quite recently, a common mark of analytical philosophy' (1992: 133–4). According to Green, this defuses the threat posed to his definition by the indisputable fact that Moore and Russell were interested in the world rather than thought or language. For

'what Dummett means by an account of thought, is an account of the objects of our thoughts, or an account of the world about which we think', an account of 'the furniture of the universe about which we think and talk' (2001: 519–20).

But this defence trades on an equivocation between the *content* of our thinking and its *object*. The content of one of my long-standing beliefs is that Vesuvius is a volcano, its object is Vesuvius. Only the object, not the content, is part of 'the world about which we think'. Dummett's analysis of thought does not scrutinize the predominantly material objects that most of our thoughts are about, otherwise it would precisely have to be an empirical investigation. Rather, it analyses what contemporary philosophers are fond of calling the 'propositional content', what is thought by the subject and said by the sentence expressing the thought.

Green is correct in noting the parallel between Dummett's passage and analytic philosophers who contend or assume that analysing the contents of our thoughts or sentences can yield knowledge about the ultimate constituents of reality.[4] But she fails to notice that this is inconsistent with Dummett's original definition. According to (1), analysing thought is not a *method* for achieving metaphysical insights into reality, it is the intrinsic *goal* of analytic philosophy. This, in conjunction with (3), is supposed to provide the rationale for (4), the claim that the philosophy of language is the foundation of the subject, which Dummett treats as definitive of analytic philosophy.

Opponents to that claim include all those who regard the philosophy of language as a branch of the philosophy of mind. They also include thinkers ranging from Foot through Rawls to Williams who pursue moral and political theory without relying on a theory of meaning. Finally, and most decisively, they include paradigmatic proponents of a linguistic turn. According to the Vienna Circle *Manifesto*, the 'task of philosophical work' lies in 'clarification' of 'traditional philosophical problems' rather than in 'the propounding of special "philosophical pronouncements"' (1929: 8), pronouncements about language and meaning included. And Wittgenstein explicitly renounced the suggestion that the philosophy of language is the foundation of philosophy. The fundamental task of philosophy is not to investigate *either* thought *or* language, but to *resolve philosophical problems*, questions that seem intractable because they are

[4] For Russell, philosophy studies the logical form of propositions. Since there is a fundamental identity of structure between true propositions and facts, an inventory of the logical forms of propositions will reveal the essential structure of reality (1914: 33, 216–17; 1917: 75; 1918: 197, 216–17, 234).

not attributable to factual ignorance. By contrast to Dummett, he also denied that we have to clarify concepts like 'language' and 'meaning' before we can clarify other concepts (see Glock 1996: 247).

What if we concentrate on (3)? The weakened link between analytic philosophy and the linguistic turn would then run somewhat as follows: *in so far as* philosophy is concerned with the analysis of the content of thought, rather than the genesis of thinking, the constitution of reality or the tenability of moral principles, it does so by way of analysing the meaningful expression of thought.

Understood in a suitably loose way, this general approach is indeed taken by Wittgenstein and his followers, a majority of logical positivists and conceptual analysts, Quine, Davidson and, of course, Dummett himself. Ayer, for instance, once underpinned it by the blunt contention: 'The process of thought is not distinct from the expression of it' (1947: 25).

At the same time, this linguistic conception of thought is repudiated by many representatives of the contemporary mainstream in Anglophone philosophy. They reverse the order of explanatory priority between thought and language, reckon with the possibility of pre-linguistic thoughts and 'non-conceptual content', and hence regard the philosophy of language as secondary not just in terms of the ultimate goal but also in terms of the method of philosophy. Dummett himself acknowledges this for the Oxford philosophers Gareth Evans and Christoper Peacocke (1993: 11, 112). John Searle, Thomas Nagel and Colin McGinn also spring to mind, and so do Chisholm and Castañeda from a previous generation.

Dummett is prepared to bite the bullet of accepting that such philosophers no longer count as analytic. His unflinching stance has been defended, moreover, on the grounds that these thinkers simply indicate that, partly as a result of its enmeshment with cognitive science, analytic philosophy is losing its distinctive identity and heading for a rapprochement with phenomenology (Green 2001: 512–13, 526–8). The problem is far more wide-reaching, however.

The idea that thought is independent of and prior to language even in the order of analysis reaches back to the dawn of analytic philosophy. It is therefore imperative to distinguish between the *rise of analytic philosophy* on the one hand, its later *linguistic turn* on the other. As Dummett himself recognizes, 'the extrusion of thoughts from the mind' (1993: ch. 4) leads in the first instance to a Platonistic rather than linguistic conception of thoughts, one in which thoughts appear as abstract entities rather than as abstractions from what people say or could say. To Bolzano and Frege it seemed that the objectivity and necessity of logic can only be secured if its

subject matter – propositions or thoughts – is resettled from the mental realm into an abstract third realm beyond space and time. Several scholars have argued that this Platonist conception prevented Frege, Dummett's analytic philosopher *par excellence*, from ever taking a linguistic turn (e.g. Baker and Hacker 1983). Frege regarded his semantic reflections as subservient to the logicist project (Sluga 1997), a project which is ultimately an epistemological one since it seeks to provide mathematics without secure foundations. To be sure, he showed considerable interest in natural languages and occasionally relied on ordinary grammar for constructing his formal system. He also regarded language as the only mirror of thoughts we have. But he put this down to limitations of human cognition rather than to the intrinsic nature of thoughts. Language is a distorting mirror, which is why the concept-script departs from ordinary language in order to mirror the structure of thought more faithfully. Logic should conduct a 'ceaseless struggle against . . . those parts of grammar which fail to give untrammeled expression to what is logical'. 'It cannot be the task of logic to investigate language and determine what is contained in a linguistic expression. Someone who wants to learn logic from language is like an adult who wants to learn how to think from a child. When men created language, they were at the stage of childish pictorial thinking. Languages are not made so as to match logic's ruler' (1979: 6–7; 1980: 67–8).

In Russell's writings we encounter diverse statements on this issue. 'The study of grammar, in my opinion, is capable of throwing far more light on philosophical questions than is commonly supposed by philosophers. Although a grammatical distinction cannot be uncritically assumed to correspond to a genuine philosophical difference, yet the one is *prima facie* evidence for the other' (1903: 42). But he also held that the abstract nature of logic defeats natural languages. For 'ordinary language is rooted in a certain feeling about logic, a certain feeling that our primitive ancestors had' (1918: 234).

Moore was preoccupied with analysing or defining concepts; he regarded propositions and concepts as components of the world rather than of thought or language (1953: 1–2; 1899: 4–8). For this reason he sought *real* rather than *nominal* definitions of the analysanda. This is to say that he did not try to report the meaning of expressions (some of his later admirers among linguistic philosophers notwithstanding), but to scrutinize the elements of the concepts and propositions that they stand for. He distinguished sharply between establishing the verbal definition of a word and inspecting in the mind's eye the concept it denotes (1903: 6; 1942: 664; see Hacker 1997b).

It is correct that the logical atomism of middle Russell and early Wittgenstein revolves around the idea that logic has metaphysical implications because the structure of reality is identical with the structure of thought, just as for Kant epistemology has metaphysical implications because the structure of reality is identical with that of experience. But this is not tantamount to accepting the further identification of the structure of *propositions* with the structure of *sentences*, and the analysis of propositions with the analysis of language. By contrast to Frege, early Moore and Russell regarded propositions and concepts as immediate components of reality rather than senses of linguistic expressions, and their analysis had no intrinsic link to an analysis of language (Monk 1997: 47–50).

There remains a possible rejoinder on Dummett's behalf. The most striking dissidents from a linguistic approach to thought are either contemporaries or figures from the inception of analytic philosophy. But, one might argue, both the beginning and the end of a tradition constitute hard cases for any taxonomy, and hard cases make for bad law. Even if this response were legitimate, however, it would not solve another problem. Dummett's linguistic definition not only *excludes* paradigmatic analytic philosophers, whether they be early Platonists or late mentalists, it also *includes* paradigmatic continental philosophers. A work by Heidegger bears the title *On the Way to Language*. For better or worse, Heidegger's followers have reached that destination. The jargon of much current philosophy on the continent – notably of French post-structuralism – is taken not from metaphysics or psychology, but from linguistics and semiotics (Derrida 1967; Foucault 1973: 386; see Rorty 1982: xx). Moreover, the idea that human thought and experience are essentially linguistic is a commonplace among hermeneutic philosophers. Gadamer writes that 'Being that can be understood is language' (1960: 450; see also 1967: 19), and Ricoeur is well known for his aphorism 'the symbol sets us thinking' (quoted in Thiselton 1998).[5]

In fact, the dominant empiricist strand within analytic philosophy, forever obsessed with the raw given presented to individual minds (impressions, sense data, neural stimulations), seems less equipped to do justice to a complex intersubjective phenomenon like language than the hermeneutic tradition. In 1918, when German philosophers like Hamann, Herder, Humboldt, and Schleiermacher had been exploring the social and

[5] I leave aside the linguistic turn that critical theory took when Habermas got into the driving seat (e.g. 1979), since he and his friend Apel (1980) were inspired partly by analytic philosophy.

historical nature of linguistic understanding for over a hundred years, an analytic genius like Russell remained so obsessed with the idea that the meanings of words are private sense-data that he was capable of claiming that people 'would not be able to talk to each other unless they attached quite different meanings to their words' (1918: 195). Contrast Gadamer: 'Understanding is itself to be conceived not so much as an act of subjectivity but rather as a move into a place within the occurring tradition' (1960: Preface).

Mulligan (1991: 17–18) sounds a note of caution. Comparisons between the analytic and the continental turns to language are 'empty', he maintains, since they disregard the fact that the latter are embedded in various forms of (transcendental) idealism. In my view Nietzsche and Gadamer are clear exceptions to this claim. But if it were right, it would provide a different grist to my mill. For in that case the distinguishing feature of analytic philosophy is precisely not a preoccupation with language *per se*. But realism is equally unsuitable as a distinguishing feature. It is notoriously unclear what the realism/idealism contrast amounts to in any philosophical tradition. Furthermore, there is literally no form of idealism that has not been condoned by some analytic philosopher or other: from the transcendental solipsism of the *Tractatus* through the phenomenalism of Russell and the early Vienna Circle to Berkeleian idealism (Foster 1982), or from the verificationism of the positivists to Putnam's internal realism and Dummettian anti-realism.[6]

Let me end on a more positive note. We must distinguish the metaphilosophical theory and the philosophical practice of counter-examples to Dummett's definition. The latter owes its plausibility to the fact that philosophers can take a linguistic turn in their actual proceedings, without having endorsed it. Both Moore's analysis of concepts and Russell's reductive analysis in the theory of descriptions in effect operate at a linguistic level, in the former case by checking the definition of a term against commonly accepted views about its applicability, in the second case by paraphrasing sentences with the help of a novel notation. Indeed, even card-carrying mentalists like Fodor remain preoccupied with language and semiotic themes. This is no coincidence. First, the linguistic turn placed the nature of intentionality at the centre of philosophy. It thereby set the

[6] Cooper (1994) also demurs at crediting continentals with a linguistic turn. His reason is that they reject the analytic project of a theory of meaning which renders explicit a system of rules which is supposed to guide linguistic competence. But even if one can disregard Habermas' and Apel's acceptance of that project, some analytic philosophers are equally hostile to it. These include Wittgensteinians (Baker and Hacker 1984) as well as followers of Quine and the later Davidson (see Glock 2003a: ch. 8.4).

agenda for current theories of meaning and content. Even the linguistic approach to this agenda remains pertinent. Whether or not it is prior to thought, language provides the paradigmatic and clearest case of intentionality, and shapes the discussion of the latter. Secondly, when it comes to the philosophical elucidation of thought, not even the most ardent subjectivist can abstain from considering sentences. For it is through their linguistic expression alone that thoughts are amenable to intersubjective paraphrase and analysis into components. Thirdly, at least in practice most analytic philosophers concede not only that the analysis of concepts and the paraphrase of propositions constitutes an important *part* of philosophy (if perhaps a propaedeutic one); they also accept the connection between concepts and propositions on the one hand, and the meaning of words and sentences on the other. Finally, analytic philosophy is to a considerable extent informal logic – 'critical thinking' in the lingo of contemporary syllabi – applied to philosophical discourse. Yet when it comes to ascertaining the import of questions, the content of claims and the cogency of arguments, it is crucial to get clear about the precise meaning of the expressions in which those questions, claims and arguments are phrased.

Nevertheless, even though analytic philosophy continues willy-nilly to employ linguistic methods, the linguistic turn is not a *doctrine* to which all and only analytic philosophers subscribe.

3 PHILOSOPHY AND SCIENCE

A third group of doctrinal definitions revolves around the relationship between philosophy and science, in particular the natural sciences. But it is somewhat disconcerting to note that there are in fact two diametrically opposed accounts of how analytic philosophy views this relation.

According to one view, analytic philosophy subscribes to a Kantian-cum-Wittgensteinian distinction between the *a priori*, conceptual analysis of philosophy and the *a posteriori*, factual descriptions and explanations of science. This view is intimated by Hacker in passages which maintain that Quine challenges the analytic movement rather than forming a part of it.[7] It covers Wittgenstein and, in his wake, the conceptual analysis practised in Cambridge and later in Oxford. It also covers the official position of the Vienna Circle, which distinguished between science and philosophy and treated the latter as a second-order discipline that reflects on the 'logic of science'.

[7] 1996: xi, 195, ch. 1. Hacker's official account is a historical one: he regards analytic philosophy as a historical movement, though one which excludes Quine. See ch. 8.2–4.

But the idea of philosophy as qualitatively distinct from science fits neither the beginnings of analytic philosophy in Russell nor the current naturalistic mainstream. For Russell, as we have seen, philosophy is no less in the business of investigating reality than science. It deals with the most general and pervasive traits of reality. Russell also regarded philosophy as a proto-science, dealing with questions that are not yet amenable to the methods of empirical science. It struggles with a problem which may appear insoluble, until, as a result of philosophical progress and then scientific breakthrough, it can be taken over by a new empirical discipline which splits off from philosophy. Underlying both views is a hankering for 'scientific method in philosophy', one that ushers in a 'truly scientific philosophy' capable of the kind of piecemeal yet steady progress attained by the natural sciences (Russell 1903: xv, 3–11, 106; 1912: 90; 1914: ch. 2; 1925: 32).

According to Quine, proper or 'scientific philosophy' does not just emulate the methods of the deductive-nomological sciences; it is itself 'continuous with science', and in fact *part* of science. Quine wants to 'rub out or at least blur the distinction between philosophy and various sciences' (1970: 2; 1994: 57, 47, 51). But he provides diverse accounts of the role philosophy is to play within science. In some places he follows Locke's famous image of philosophy as an *underlabourer*: philosophy is a 'handmaiden to science' with the task of 'tying up loose ends' such as paradoxes and questions of evidence, problems that working scientists tend to ignore. In others he is closer to the more flattering Aristotelian image of philosophy as the *queen* of the sciences. It deals with the 'general, basic concepts of science' such as truth, existence and necessity (1994: 57, 47–8). In more typical passages, he follows Russell and expresses the same view by reference to reality rather than concepts. Philosophy is concerned with 'a limning of the most general traits of reality'. It investigates the fundamental 'furniture of our universe', and differs from science only quantitatively, in the generality and breadth of its questions and categories (1960: 161, 254, 228–9, 275–6).

Hacker is aware, of course, that Quine's conception of analytic philosophy as continuous with science reverts in many respects to that of Russell. He maintains, however, that this does not militate against his conception of analytic philosophy on the grounds that this Russellian conception had lain dormant for forty years, and that Quine did not share Russell's account of logical analysis (1996: 319–20n). Both claims are contentious. Neither the American converts to logical positivism (Nagel, Morris) nor the strong anti-Wittgensteinian branch of the Vienna Circle led by Neurath subscribed to a demarcation between philosophy and science. Witness the following contrast. In 1930 Schlick wrote:

But what is [philosophy], then? Well, not a science indeed, but still something so great and significant that it may continue to be honoured henceforth, as in former days, as the queen of the sciences; for it is nowhere laid down that the queen of the sciences must herself also be a science. We now see in her . . . not a system of knowledge but a system of *acts*; philosophy, in fact, is the activity whereby the *meaning* of statements is established or discovered. Philosophy elucidates propositions, science verifies them. (1979: II 157)

In 1931 Neurath responded:

All members of the Vienna Circle agree that there is no 'philosophy' with its own special statements. Some people, however, still wish to separate the discussions of the conceptual foundations of the sciences from the body of scientific work and allow this to continue as 'philosophizing'. Close reflexions show that even this separation is not feasible, and that the definition of concepts is part and parcel of the work of unified science. (1983: 52)

Furthermore, even if before Quine there had not been any subscribers to Russell's views on the relationship between philosophy and science, Russell's views were never remotely forgotten, even amongst those in thrall to his antipode Wittgenstein. They remained an indispensable point of reference for all analytic philosophers, even during the heyday of the distinction between philosophy and science between the 1930s and the 1960s. Indeed, Austin even shared Russell's image of philosophy as a proto-science:

In the history of human inquiry, philosophy has the place of the initial central sun, seminal and tumultuous: from time to time it throws off some portion of itself to take station as a science, a planet, cool and well regulated, progressing steadily towards a distant final state . . . Is it not possible that the next century may see the birth, through the joint labours of philosophers, grammarians, and numerous other students of language, of a true and comprehensive *science of language*? Then we shall have rid ourselves of one more part of philosophy (there will still be plenty left) in the only way we ever can get rid of philosophy, by kicking it upstairs. (1970: 232)

This is precisely the kind of vision that drives current interdisciplinary efforts in cognitive science, in their case a vision inspired by Quinean naturalism.

The case for regarding Quine as emblematic of a particular strand of analytic philosophy is overwhelming. He is regarded as the most eminent analytic philosopher after Wittgenstein by a majority of those who regard themselves as analytic philosophers, including many who do not subscribe to his doctrines. Furthermore, Quine is explicitly preoccupied with logical analysis and paraphrase. Examples of it 'are legion in *Word and Object*', and

just as Ramsey treated the theory of descriptions as a paradigm of philosophy, Quine does the same for the explication of the ordered pair (Hylton 1998: 50). Finally, Quine's logical analysis is quite close to Russell, not just in its instruments, notably the theory of descriptions, but also in one other respect (and here I disagree with Hylton). He strives to devise an ideal language or canonical notation which will display the real structure of reality, rather than, e.g., the disguised logical form underlying ordinary language.

Some academics, such as certain 'neuro-philosophers', take Quine literally and try to solve philosophical problems directly through empirical investigations, in complete disregard of *a priori* and conceptual issues. There may be a case for insisting that they should no longer count as analytic philosophers, or even as philosophers *tout court*. But there is no gainsaying the fact that important analytic philosophers like Russell, Neurath and Quine have regarded philosophy as part of, or at any rate continuous with, science.

The second doctrinal definition based on the relationship between philosophy and science goes in the opposite direction of the first. It identifies analytic philosophy with naturalism. In the wake of Quine, few analytic philosophers these days would dare to publish a book on the philosophy of mind, without at least professing allegiance to some form of naturalism in the preface. Thus Jackson states: 'Most analytic philosophers describe themselves as naturalists' (2003: 32). Kim confines the point to the present: 'If current analytic philosophy can be said to have a philosophical ideology, it is, unquestionably, naturalism' (2003: 84). And Leiter (2004a: 5) diagnoses a 'naturalistic turn' in philosophy that rivals the earlier linguistic turn in importance. Nevertheless, to maintain that analytic philosophy is essentially or even predominantly naturalistic is just as erroneous as to dissociate it from naturalism. Although there has been a notable swing towards naturalism in recent years, it has been resisted by eminent figures such as Strawson, Kripke, McDowell, Dummett and Putnam (see Putnam 1992: ix–x). But in order to appreciate the relation between analytic philosophy and naturalism we first require a more discerning conception of the latter.

In 1954 Ernest Nagel observed: 'the number of distinguishable doctrines for which the word "naturalism" has been a counter in the history of philosophy is notorious' (1954: 3). This remark is even more apposite today (see Keil 2008). There are almost as many definitions of naturalism as there are proponents. Nevertheless, one can distinguish at least three different types of naturalism:

- Metaphilosophical naturalism claims that philosophy is a branch of or continuous with natural science;
- Epistemological naturalism is nothing other than scientism: it insists that there is no genuine knowledge outside natural science;
- Ontological naturalism denies that there is any realm other than the natural world of matter, energy, and spatio-temporal objects or events.

There are important connections between these positions. What counts as natural to ontological naturalism can be formulated through independent metaphysical criteria, e.g. as anything within the 'spatio-temporal-causal realm' (Katz 1990: 239; similarly Armstrong 1983: 82). This type of naturalism is a monistic position on what exists or is real. It is a version of materialism or, assuming that modern post-mechanistic physics allows for phenomena that are not material, a version of physicalism. Alternatively, what counts as natural can be explained epistemically, as comprising anything that features in scientific explanation as explanandum or explanans (Danto 1967: 448). In Sellars' famous words: 'in the dimension of describing and explaining the world, science is the measure of all things, of what is that it is, and of what is not that it is not' (1963: 173).

One reason why naturalists often prefer the second option (apart from the obvious one of insulating their ontological claims from direct philosophical criticism) is that it defuses a potential conflict between ontological and metaphilosophical naturalism. Instead of pronouncing on what exists *ex cathedra*, on the basis of *a priori* contemplation, naturalism follows the lead of science. The question of what exists turns into the question of what science reckons with. This idea goes back to Quine, whose naturalistic ontology rests on the conviction 'that it is within science itself, and not in some prior philosophy, that reality is to be identified and described' (1981: 21).

Metaphilosophical naturalism, for its part, is also known as 'methodological naturalism', since it concerns the topics, procedures and results of proper philosophizing, and entreats philosophers to emulate the methods of the special sciences (e.g. Maddy 1998: 161; Leiter 2001: 82–4). Metaphilosophical naturalists variously characterize philosophy either as *part* of science or as *continuous* with it. The first version is in play when Quine describes naturalized epistemology as a 'chapter of psychology and hence of natural science' (1969: 82; also Papineau 1993: 5). The second features when he writes: 'Naturalistic philosophy is continuous with natural science' (1995: 256–7).

It is natural to suppose that metaphilosophical naturalism is but the application of epistemological naturalism to the subject of philosophy.

This presupposes, however, that philosophy aspires to knowledge. Of course, many will exclaim in exasperation, though not without opposition from some analytic philosophers. As we have seen, the early Wittgenstein and Schlick rejected this cognitivist assumption. Indeed, they are committed to combining epistemological naturalism – the only propositions with sense and hence the only *candidates* for knowledge are those of empirical science – with metaphilosophical anti-naturalism – philosophy is an analytic activity rather than a doctrine and *a fortiori* distinct from science.

The question of what counts as science is a festering thorn in the side of epistemological naturalism. Its representatives hold that 'unqualified cognitive value resides in science and nothing else' or that 'science is the highest path to truth' (Moreland 1998: 37; Quine 1995: 261). But which academic disciplines are extolled and which are humbled by these verdicts? Hawks under the sway of the unity of science restrict science to the hard natural sciences, and in particular to physics, and allow other disciplines only in so far as their laws can be derived from those of physics. Doves, often of a pragmatist bent, welcome any discipline that is cognitively successful, including biology, psychology and even the social and historical sciences. There is a whole spectrum of possible stances here, and many naturalists waver between different locations on that spectrum (cf. Quine 1969: 24 and 2000: 411).

Finally, all versions of naturalism come in both an *eliminativist* and a *reductionist* form. Faced with apparent counter-examples – philosophical methods that do not rely on science, knowledge claims of a non-scientific kind or entities beyond the natural world – a naturalist has two options. She can either dismiss them as spurious or try to show that on closer scrutiny they boil down to a scientific or natural phenomenon. It is exclusively the reductionist option, however, which fuels the ubiquitous projects of *naturalizing* a certain phenomenon such as intentionality, meaning or morality. The aim of such an enterprise is to demonstrate that the phenomenon in question is real only because it is *really something else* (Fodor 1987: 98), namely something which is part of the natural order and can therefore be accommodated within science. By the same token, the discipline dealing with the phenomenon will be transformed into a branch of science that provides a causal explanation of it, e.g. psychology.

An obvious problem for a naturalistic definition of analytic philosophy is that each and every one of these tenets has been rejected by an illustrious and indeed paradigmatic specimen. As we have seen, rightly or wrongly an overwhelming majority of analytic philosophers before the 1980s repudiated the naturalization of morality, and their flag is kept flying by

present-day Kantians and neo-intuitionists. The attempt to naturalize logic is nothing other than psychologism. That attempt was mocked by Frege: the causal 'explanation of a mental process that ends in taking something to be true, can never take the place of proving what is taken to be true'. We must distinguish between the causal conditions for holding a belief and the logical conditions for its truth, lest we think that the proof of Pythagoras' theorem might have to mention the phosphate content of our brain (1884: XVIII, 1979: 5; see Glock 1999b). Inspired by Frege, Geach does not mince his words on reductionist naturalism:

> When we hear of some new attempt to explain reasoning or language or choice naturalistically, we ought to react as if we were told someone had squared the circle or proved $\sqrt{2}$ to be rational: only the mildest curiosity is in order – how well has the fallacy been concealed? (1977: 52)

This unbridled hostility carries over directly to epistemic naturalism. The idea that there is no knowledge other than that of natural science was rejected by Frege – who pointed out the autonomy of logic and mathematics from *a posteriori* disciplines – greeted with incredulity by Moore – who insisted on the existence of non-scientific knowledge in ethics and common sense – and incensed the later Wittgenstein, who loathed the scientistic spirit of his age. It has provoked even a mild-mannered philosopher like Strawson to comment: 'From such philistinism as this we can only avert our eyes' (1997: 35; see also Dummett 2007: 10).

One important strand within continental philosophy, hermeneutics, resists epistemic naturalism by insisting that the methods of the human and social sciences are *sui generis*, revolving around understanding rather than the causal explanations of the deductive nomological sciences. And it is true that analytic philosophers, notably Hempel, have combated this methodological pluralism in the name of the unity of science. But the unity of science and its assimilation of the social to the natural sciences is not a hallmark of analytic philosophy (*pace* Mulligan 1991: 116, 119). There is also an analytic version of hermeneutics, and it covers not just Wittgensteinians like von Wright (1971) who contrast reasons and causes, but also Davidson (1980), who identifies them. A distinction between natural and social science is also drawn by Searle (1995).

There may be knowledge outside of science, yet *philosophy* might still be allocated a place within science, just as metaphilosophical naturalism has it. We must distinguish, however, between the idea that philosophy should emulate certain highly general ideals of modern science – such as precision, intersubjective scrutiny of results and collaboration – and the idea that it

pursues the same goals and employs the same methods. This second claim is repudiated not just by the usual suspects – Wittgensteinians and conceptual analysts – but also by many who aim to philosophize in the scientific spirit of the first claim.

Frege not just denied that logic is a natural science; he also insisted that it is more fundamental than either metaphysics or psychology (1893: XIX). The Wittgensteinian idea that there should be a *division of labour* between science and philosophy was explicitly preached by Schlick and Waismann. In a more technical and science-oriented manner, this image is also evident in Carnap. Philosophy is not a doctrine consisting of propositions but a method, namely of logical analysis. Negatively, it reveals metaphysical nonsense. Positively, it turns into the 'logic of science', namely the linguistic analysis or explication of scientific propositions, concepts and methods (1937: 279). This demarcation of philosophy and science underlies Carnap's distinction between analytic and synthetic propositions in *The Logical Syntax of Language*, and his distinction between internal and external questions in 'Empiricism, Semantics and Ontology' (1956). He reasserted it late in life. Scientific philosophy is not philosophy that meddles in the scientific investigation of reality. Instead, it is philosophy that reflects on this investigation in the same rational and collaborative spirit as the one which guides the first-order explorations of the scientists themselves (1964: 133–4).

As regards the fundamental question of how philosophy stands to science, the front lines within the Vienna Circle ran neither between the 'right wing' conservatives (Schlick, Waismann) and the 'left wing' progressives (Neurath, Carnap, Hahn), nor between the phenomenalists (Schlick, early Carnap) and the physicalists (Neurath, later Carnap). It ran between the Wittgensteinians (Schlick, Waismann and Carnap) on the one hand, and Neurath on the other, who anticipated Quine's assimilation of philosophy to science.

We cannot salvage the idea of analytic philosophy as committed to metaphilosophical naturalism by restricting ourselves to the present, the way Kim does. Quine's repudiation of the analytic/synthetic distinction has won widespread approval, and numerous authors still appeal to what they take to be axiomatic wisdom. But there are also growing signs of dissent. Followers of Wittgenstein, Grice and Strawson still demur. Even in the USA, which has traditionally inclined towards naturalism, Carnap has undergone a revival. Thus Friedman has argued that a Carnapian distinction between analytic and synthetic propositions is called for rather than precluded by the attempt to make sense of natural science (1997). In

addition, various forms of an analytic/synthetic distinction have been rehabilitated by thinkers as diverse as Boghossian, Putnam and McDowell. Indeed, though curiously ignored by acolytes, Quine himself came to recognize that there is a legitimate dichotomy between the analytic and the synthetic, one which approximates the intuitive conception of analyticity: 'a sentence is analytic if *everybody* learns that it is true by learning its words' (1974: 79; see Glock 2003a: 81–6). And the idea of philosophy as conceptual analysis has been defended in a novel fashion by Jackson (1998), notwithstanding his naturalistic sympathies.

Even if all analytic philosophers had jettisoned the analytic/synthetic distinction, this would only bar them from setting philosophy apart on the grounds that it aspires to or results in (non-obvious) analytic or conceptual truths. They could still demarcate philosophy from science along other lines. The most obvious one is the idea of philosophy being *a priori*. Combining epistemological and metaphilosophical naturalism, Devitt insists that 'there is only one way of knowing, the empirical way, that is the basis of science'; hence, 'from a naturalistic perspective, we should deny that there is *any* a priori knowledge' (1996: 2, 49).

For reasons already touched upon, however, this is actually a *minority* view in the career of analytic philosophy. Frege rejected the empiricist thesis that all knowledge is based on induction; while he did not deny Mill 'a spark of good sense', he deplored that it is 'no sooner lit than extinguished, thanks to his preconception that all knowledge is empirical' (1884: 9, §3n, 4n). Both Russell and Moore accepted the possibility of *a priori* knowledge and regarded philosophy as an *a priori* discipline. Dissent from Mill's claim that all knowledge is *a posteriori* was also the driving force behind the conventionalism of the logical positivists. Wittgenstein, conceptual analysis and their contemporary off-shoots all insist on the non-empirical character of logic, mathematics and philosophy.

Even some of their opponents are committed to *a priori* knowledge. Bonjour has recently rushed to the 'defense of pure reason' (1998), though not in a way that Kant would have appreciated. More significantly, Kripke and his numerous followers hold that some propositions – e.g. 'The standard metre is 1 metre long' are contingent yet *a priori*. Furthermore, their defence of *a posteriori* necessary propositions combines scientific discoveries, e.g. that water consists of H_2O molecules, with *a priori* reflections on the semantics of proper names and natural kind terms. More generally, there is widespread acceptance that post-Kripkean metaphysics features non-empirical problems, propositions and lines of reasoning at least among other things (Jackson 2003; Williamson 2004: 127–8).

Finally, Williams sets philosophy apart without appeal to either the analytic or the *a priori*, by insisting that it requires a humanistic and historical understanding absent from the natural sciences (2006).

The widespread impression that contemporary analytic philosophy, at least, is tied to metaphilosophical naturalism owes an unfortunate debt to intellectual salesmanship. Quine and his followers oppose the goal of a 'prior' or 'first philosophy' on the grounds that the natural sciences are 'fallible and corrigible but not answerable to any supra-scientific tribunal'. 'I see philosophy not as an *a priori* propaedeutic or groundwork for science, but as continuous with science' (1981: 72; 1969: 126).

Through this ploy they have managed to tarnish their opponents – linguistic philosophers like Wittgenstein, Carnap or Ryle – with the brush of two ideas that have apparently been consigned to the dustbin of history by the development of science. One is the Aristotelian doctrine according to which philosophy off its own bat provides the axioms from which the special sciences proceed. The other is the Cartesian quest for absolute certainty. But this is a caricature. What linguistic philosophers aspire to is not a super-science, one which provides mere science with unshakeable foundations, but a second-order discipline which deals with problems of a different – conceptual or methodological – kind. In fact, these reflections have predominantly resulted in a rejection both of the Aristotelian conception of philosophy as the queen of the sciences and of Cartesian foundationalism. At the same time, these two positions have also had followers within analytic philosophy. Foundationalists, for instance, range from Ayer through Chisholm to contemporaries like Alston, Audi and Sosa.

A naturalistic conception of analytic philosophy cannot be based on either the epistemological or the metaphilosophical variety. Ontological naturalism may seem a better bet. For many distinguished practitioners seek to steer a middle course between the Scylla of epistemological naturalism and the Charybdis of ontological *super*naturalism. Wittgenstein famously compared language to a game like chess. On the one hand, a chess-piece is a piece of wood that can be described by physics. On the other hand, one cannot explain what a chess-piece or what the game of chess is in purely physical terms. But the difference between a chess-piece and a simple piece of wood is not that the former is associated with an abstract entity or with a process in a separate mental realm. It is rather that the chess-piece has a role in a rule-guided practice (1953: §108).

Following Wittgenstein's analogy, contemporaries like Brandom, Hacker, McDowell and Putnam have developed the idea that human

beings are special not because they are connected to a reality beyond the physical world of space, time and matter (a Platonist third realm or Cartesian soul substances, for example), but because they can only be adequately understood from a normative perspective, one that is alien to the natural sciences. There is knowledge outside of natural science, knowledge of language, logic and mathematics, for example. Yet the special status of such knowledge does not derive from a special subject matter – supernatural entities beyond space or time; it must instead be explained by reference to normative practices (speaking, reasoning, calculating). These practices in turn presuppose agents with distinctively human capacities. But while these capacities cannot be adequately characterized in physical terms, they do not transcend the natural world. They are perfectly intelligible features of animals of a unique kind; and their causal prerequisites and evolutionary emergence can be explained by science.

Without appealing to normativity, Davidson (1980: ch. 11) steers a parallel course. His anomalous monism is 'ontological monism coupled with conceptual dualism'. It tries to reconcile the naturalistic (anti-Platonist and anti-Cartesian) claim that there is no realm beyond the physical with a recognition that mental and semantic discourse is neither reducible to nor replaceable by the idiom of natural science. 'There are no such things as minds, but people have mental properties ... These properties are constantly changing, and such changes are mental events' (1994: 231).

Strawson distinguished a soft, catholic or liberal naturalism from a hard, strict or reductive one (1986: 1–2, 38–41). In the same spirit, McDowell distances his own 'naturalism of second nature' from 'bald naturalism' (1996: chs. IV–V), and Hornsby (1997) her 'naïve naturalism' from scientistic versions. This is indicative of a general trend among those opposed to scientism and reductionism, namely to distinguish between good (ontological) and bad (epistemological) types of naturalism. However, analytic philosophy also features important thinkers who resist the allure of both (see Corradini and Lowe 2006). To appreciate this one only needs to remember that ontological naturalism rules out at least three venerable positions – theism, Platonism and mind-body dualism. Neither a transcendent creator God, nor abstract entities beyond space and time, nor Cartesian souls, egos or selves are denizens of the spatio-temporal realm. There is a distinguished tradition of analytic theists, including Plantinga, van Inwagen and Swinburne. There is also the more specific yet equally flourishing enterprise of analytic Thomism.

Platonism was not just a guiding force in the emergence of analytic philosophy in Bolzano, Frege, Moore and Russell. It was also espoused by Church and Popper, among others. And it remains a live option to this day, for instance in neo-Fregeans like Wright (1983). Indeed, it is generally acknowledged that both full-blooded naturalists and proponents of the third way have their work cut out for them in accounting for logic and philosophy by way of either reduction or elimination. Even Quine, metaphilosophical naturalist *par excellence*, grudgingly admits abstract objects – namely classes – into his ontology, since they are indispensable to science and cannot be paraphrased away (1960: §§53–5). Mind-body substance dualism is in many respects the least popular branch of anti-naturalism. But even it has been vigorously defended by authors like Swinburne (1986) and Lowe (2000). Indeed, whether rightly or wrongly, the emerging consensus is that qualia may constitute a lethal stumbling block to physicalism (see Chalmers 1996; Kim 2004) and hence to ontological naturalism.

Even if we define naturalism disjunctively over all three of its main versions, important figures throughout the history of analytic philosophy would be excluded. Some characterizations go further still, transforming naturalism from a broad church into an all-encompassing one, fool-proof against threat from heathens and heretics. Thus Quine qualifies his ontological credo that 'the world is as natural science says it is' by adding the proviso 'insofar as natural science is right' (1992: 9). Ironically, this is analytic. To use Quine's own terminology, in this sentence the term 'natural science' does not occur essentially; it can be replaced by the name of any other entity capable of saying how the world is, whether it be 'Bush', 'astrology', or even, shock-horror, 'deconstructivism'.

Another famous naturalist described naturalism as guided by 'respect for the conclusions of natural science'; a second famous naturalist described it as 'less a philosophical system than a recognition of the impressive implications of the physical and biological sciences', and declared 'We are all naturalists now.' Not unreasonably, given this minimalist conception. But as the son of that second naturalist observed: 'As for Naturalism. That, too, had negative overtones at home. It was as wishy-washy and ambiguous as Pragmatism. One could believe *almost* everything about the world and even *some* things about God, and yet be a Naturalist. What was needed was a new, nonreductive materialism'. The first naturalist was Dewey (1944: 2),

the second R. W. Sellars (1922: i), and the third his son Wilfrid Sellars (1979: 2). Sellars junior is absolutely right to inveigh against a conception of naturalism which encompasses even theists – however tempted some contemporary theists may be to jump onto the naturalistic bandwagon. Furthermore, even if it were legitimate and fruitful to characterize naturalism in such an indiscriminating fashion, this would not salvage a naturalist definition of analytic philosophy. For Dewey, R. W. Sellars and those the latter referred to as 'we' were *not* analytic philosophers. They are excluded not just by common philosophical usage but also by any criterion that is even remotely plausible. The same goes for Nietzsche with a vengeance, his naturalistic leanings notwithstanding. 'Long live physics!', he enthused in *The Gay Science* (1882: §335).

4 TOPICAL DEFINITIONS

While accepting that analytic philosophers disagree even on fairly fundamental doctrines, some commentators maintain that they are united by the topics on which they disagree. Cohen (1986: 10–11, 57) may be alone in explicitly advancing a topical definition of analytic philosophy to be contrasted with doctrinal and methodological ones. But several authors characterize analytic philosophy in topical terms. It is even more common to find remarks such as these: 'John Searle was raised in the tradition of analytic philosophy, but he transcends that tradition. One reason is that he writes on a variety of topics even though his tradition encourages its supporters to focus narrowly on certain aspects of one or two topics' (Fotion 2000: 1).

One popular prejudice about analytic philosophy is that it tends to concern itself with a very narrow set of topics belonging to theoretical philosophy, in particular to (formal and philosophical) logic, philosophy of science, philosophy of language, metaphysics and philosophy of mind. The role of ethics and politics within analytic philosophy will be discussed in chapter 7. There we shall see that analytic philosophy has entirely overcome its relative neglect of moral and political theory between 1910 and 1960.

The case of aesthetics resembles that of ethics. Judgements of aesthetic value were regarded as bereft of cognitive content by both the logical positivists and the early Wittgenstein (1922: 6.42–6.421), and aesthetics was therefore restricted to the analysis of aesthetic concepts and the examination of the status of aesthetic statements. As in the parallel case of ethics, however, the proscription of first-order investigations was

gradually lifted after World War II. And as regards second-order investigations, Wittgenstein's later ideas about family-resemblance initiated a lively debate about the very possibility of analysing or defining terms like 'art' and 'work of art' (see Davies 1998). Goodman's iconoclastic reflections on pictorial representation stimulated aesthetic debate of yet another kind (see Hyman 2006).

But there are other topics which, in the eyes of some, have been neglected by analytic philosophers and pursued instead by their rivals. Thus Passmore opines that 'Franco-German-Italian philosophy' has been 'centrally concerned with the issues which have preoccupied theology', while 'Anglo-American philosophy' devoted 'its attention to epistemology, mind and language' (1985: 11). As Cooper (1994: 3) points out, however, Passmore's own discussion of continental thinkers completely omits religion, and instead focuses on their views concerning – epistemology, mind and language! One might add that analytic philosophy has produced most of the twentieth century's leading philosophers of religion, figures as diverse as Kenny, Mackie, Phillips, Plantinga and Swinburne. Furthermore, philosophy of religion plays a much greater role in Anglo-American countries than on the continent. This is no coincidence, since religious convictions are much more widespread in the USA than in secular societies like France, Germany or Italy, and hence more liable to be a fulcrum of philosophical attention.

At the same time, Cooper himself claims two other distinctive interests for continental philosophy, namely the background condition of inquiry and the fall of the self. But both topoi have also featured in analytic philosophy. Different types of background conditions for knowledge have played a role in Wittgenstein's *On Certainty*, Quine's naturalized epistemology and Searle's theory of social reality. Even sociological background conditions have been popular themes in analytic philosophy since Kuhn and Feyerabend.

The idea that continental philosophy has a special love-hate relation to the self which is absent from analytic philosophy is *prima facie* more plausible, or at any rate more popular. Henrich, a leading German neo-Hegelian, informs us that 'continental philosophy takes the relation between the transcendental constitution of the person and the concept of philosophy as constitutive of philosophy, whereas empiricist philosophy tends to emphasize scientific and critical standards' (2003: 7). And in *Continental Philosophy since 1750: the Rise and Fall of the Self*, Solomon (1988) manages to portray philosophers on the continent – including even Kant and Husserl – as concerned mainly if not solely with inflating or

deflating the sense of their own egos in accordance with their emotional needs and political foibles.

Though hardly an admirer of Post-Kantian continental philosophy, I am loathe to accept that it reduces to precisely this rigmarole. In any event, however, a concern with the problem of the self is definitely not the prerogative of the continentals. When it comes to attacking the 'self' as an illusion or fiction imposed by linguistic appearances, the tradition running from Wittgenstein and Russell through Ryle and Strawson to Dennett and Hacker is second to none. But there are also unflinching defenders of a metaphysical self (see G. Strawson 2005).

In general, after the war analytic philosophy became both more widespread and more catholic in its coverage. Exotic topics abound at recent APA meetings (Stroll 2000: 269–70). At present there is literally no area that has escaped the attention of analytic philosophers, whether it be the philosophy of the body and of sexuality (Soble 1998), eco-philosophy (Naess 1989), feminist epistemology (Alcoff and Potter 1993), the philosophy of computing (Floridi 2004), or psychoanalysis (Gardner 1993). For any significant area of human thought *x*, there is not just a *philosophy* of *x* but also an *analytic* philosophy of *x*. With respect to traditional and central areas, this analytic philosophy of *x* post-dated the traditional philosophy of *x*. Analytic theory of knowledge and analytic moral philosophy are obvious examples. But with respect to more peripheral or more recent topics, the analytic philosophy of *x* often came first, especially in the area of moral philosophy (see ch. 7.1).

Accordingly, the *exclusion* of certain topics is not a distinctive feature of analytic philosophy. What about the *emphasis* on other topics? For reasons mentioned in chapter 2.2, analytic philosophy arose in the context of discussions about mathematics and logic, and, to a lesser extent, discussions of natural science and psychology. The linguistic turn transformed its concern with these areas and linked it to an interest in language. And the revival of metaphysics and the turn to the mind transformed them once again. But an interest in these areas was never the prerogative of analytic philosophy. Science has been central to traditional philosophy and plays a role even in continental philosophy. And metaphysics has of course been a central part of philosophy throughout its history.

If analytic philosophy is characterized by a topic, it had better be more specific. Some historians have linked the analytic tradition to a very particular topic, one which we owe to Kant. Robert Hanna writes: 'The history of analytic philosophy from Frege to Quine is the history of the rise and fall of the concept of analyticity, whose origins and parameters both lie in Kant's first *Critique*' (2001: 121). The idea that analytic philosophy consists of predominantly hostile footnotes to Kant also emerges from Coffa (1991), in spite of his antipathy to Kant and Neo-Kantianism. It is a salutary reminder of Kant's importance to analytic philosophy.

The topic of analyticity is very important, because it is linked to the status of logical, mathematical and philosophical (metaphysical) propositions which plays such a dominant role in the early development of analytic philosophy. Hannah's pronouncement covers Frege, whose logicism is an answer to Kant's question of whether arithmetic is analytic. It also covers Wittgenstein, whose philosophy revolves in a very Kantian way around the connection between the nature of philosophy and the nature of necessity and a priority (Glock 1997a). Furthermore, it covers the logical positivists, who were just as obsessed with the possibility of synthetic *a priori* knowledge as Kant was, though they reached the opposite conclusion. Even Quine fits the picture. It is no coincidence that his revival of radical empiricism and naturalism proceeds through an attempt to undermine the analytic/synthetic distinction, and the associated distinction of *a priori* and *a posteriori* knowledge. The new Kripkean essentialism tries to undermine the Kantian dichotomies in yet another way. But in doing so it pays homage to the archetypal Kantian conundrum of how we might come by substantive knowledge about reality without the aid of experience.

At the same time, the importance of analyticity and the synthetic *a priori* must not be exaggerated. Though Moore and Russell on occasion employed versions of the analytic/synthetic distinction, their work did not revolve around it. The same goes for Cambridge analysis between the wars, and for much Oxford philosophy, especially for Austin. The characterization also excludes a lot of post-positivist and post-Quinean analytic philosophy in the metaphysical vein, which has moved beyond these topics, if only by treating Quine's attack on the analytic/synthetic distinction as axiomatic. Finally, in the ever expanding field of moral and political theory, the analytic/synthetic distinction has never played a central role.

What is correct is this. There is a more general Kantian problem, namely whether, and if so how, philosophy can be conceived as an autonomous discipline distinct from the empirical sciences. And this problem has loomed large in the work of most analytic philosophers who have engaged in metaphilosophical reflections. But not all analytic philosophers are given to such reflections.

Conversely, a preoccupation with analyticity and the synthetic *a priori* would include much of early continental philosophy. Both the Neo-Kantians and Husserl were profoundly concerned with the possibility of

synthetic *a priori* knowledge. As mentioned before, the Neo-Kantian position provided the starting point for leading logical positivists such as Schlick, Reichenbach and Carnap. Furthermore, Husserl's extended list of synthetic judgements *a priori* constituted a major challenge for both Wittgenstein (1979) and the logical positivists, who discussed examples like 'Nothing can be red and green all over at the same time' *ad nauseam*. And the more general Kantian problem about the status of philosophy vis-à-vis science plays an even more pervasive role in continental philosophy (see Critchley 2001).

Cohen's topical definition faces the same obstacles. He defines analytic philosophy as the *Dialogue of Reason*, which is to say that it is 'the reasoned investigation of reasons', 'the reasoned discussion of what can be a reason for what' (1986: 49–50, 57). Cohen struggles valiantly to show that this covers not just analytic philosophy's discussion of scepticism, the paradoxes and the theory of action, but also, e.g., its preoccupation with meaning and the mind-body issue. But he relies on at least two questionable manoeuvres. The first is to move from the observation that a certain topic of analytic philosophy is connected to reason to the conclusion that it is *au fond* reason itself that is the focus of interest. For instance, he observes that the analysis of concepts often specifies conditions for the application of words, and draws the conclusion that concepts are of interest to analytic philosophy only because of the reasons for their application. The second manoeuvre is to observe that analytic philosophy aspires to tackle a topic like the mind-body problem in a *rational manner*, and to conclude from this that its real interest is 'to investigate how we can reason coherently on such issues' (1986: 51). Yet there is an obvious difference between the all too common discussion of how the mind is related to the body and the much rarer metaphilosophical discussion of how that issue is to be tackled.

Cohen is alive to the converse problem that a preoccupation with reason is a rather ostentatious feature of *non*-analytic philosophers such as Hegel. In excluding such cases he ultimately relies on a feature which is already explicit in his definition, namely that analytic philosophy is a *reasoned* investigation of reason. That only goes to show one thing, however. In spite of his explicit rejection of methodological conceptions, Cohen's own definition is not a purely topical one, but instead involves a methodological aspect, a reference to how any given topic is to be approached. And it is to such definitions that we must now turn.

CHAPTER 6

Method and style

In the last chapter we considered the most straightforward way of defining a philosophical movement, material definitions in terms of shared doctrines or interests. We found that this is not a viable option in the case of analytic philosophy. To some commentators, this negative result casts doubt on the very idea that analytic philosophy is a distinctive phenomenon. Thus Aaron Preston insists that analytic philosophy *must* be definable by adherence to a certain doctrine or 'theory', or else relinquish its claim to count among the 'philosophical groups ("schools," "movements," or whatever)' (2004: 445–6; see also Preston 2007; de Gaynesford 2006: 21). Preston concedes that there is an 'ordinary', 'precritical, or unprecisified concept of analytic philosophy', according to which it is first, 'a school of philosophy that now exists', and, secondly, one that originated around the turn of the twentieth century. He thinks, however, that this ordinary concept is just as vacuous as that of a witch. Since there is no common doctrine uniting the people normally classified as analytic philosophers, 'there is no such thing as analytic philosophy is ordinarily conceived to be', and it makes scant sense to continue to talk about analytic philosophy (2004: 453–9).

A different reaction is more plausible: if our concept of analytic philosophy does not capture a single set of doctrines, perhaps it captures *something else*. Preston rejects this option *ab initio*. His argument in effect runs as follows:

P_1 A school requires that there should be 'defining criteria' for membership in it.

P_2 To use 'philosophical' as a 'differentia' for a school, implies that the defining criteria for that school 'have to do with philosophy'.

P_3 Philosophy is a 'theoretical discipline', i.e. in the business of advancing theories.

C The defining criteria of a philosophical school must be acceptance of a certain theory.

As we have seen, P_3 would not be accepted by Wittgenstein and many of his followers. Furthermore, *pace* Preston it makes sense to distinguish between a